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The European Social Model
and the United States
Jens Alber
Social Science Research Center Berlin, Germany
A B S T R A C T
The notion of a European social model assumes that Euro-
pean societies have certain features in common that distin-
guish them from the United States. Analysing longitudinal
data on the dimensions of state, economy and society three
findings stand out: (1) for most indicators the range of vari-
ation within the European Union is bigger than the gap
between Europe and the United States; (2) counter to the
idea of policy convergence, differences in the developmental
trajectories of countries with different institutional arrange-
ments persist; (3) despite having extended welfare states
similar to those of Continental European countries, Scandi-
navian nations have performed as well as the Anglo-Saxon
countries in terms of employment and growth dynamics.
Hence there are not only different social models in Europe
but also different pathways to success.
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The concept: What do we mean by a ‘European Social
Model’?
The ‘European Social Model’, though frequently referred to in politicians’
speeches, is rarely defined with any precision. Perhaps one of the clearest
attempts at an official definition may be found in the Presidency Conclusions
of the Nice European Council meeting of 2000, where annex 1 describing the
European Social Agenda states:
The European social model, characterised in particular by systems that offer a
high level of social protection, by the importance of the social dialogue and by
services of general interest covering activities vital for social cohesion, is today
based, beyond the diversity of the Member States’ social systems, on a common
core of values. (European Council, 2000b)
Here we find four elements: (1) a high level of social protection with services
of general interest; (2) the social dialogue, referring to coordinated policy-
making with collective agreements negotiated by the social partners; (3) an
emphasis on social cohesion, and (4) a set of common core values. Article I-
2 of the Treaty establishing a constitution for Europe specifies which common
values are meant exactly: ‘pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice,
solidarity and equality between women and men’ (Official Journal of the
European Union, 2004). In addition, Article 2 of the Treaty establishing the
European Community lists five further key elements: a high level of employ-
ment, sustainable and non-inflationary growth, economic competitiveness, an
elevated quality of life, and a high level of the quality of the environment
(Official Journal of the European Union, 2003).
These official statements make it clear that the term ‘European social
model’ is to encompass more than a mere model of social policy. The docu-
ments rather make reference to embracing characteristics in the dimensions
of state, economy and society. Implicitly – and in more recent times also
explicitly – the term is often used to distinguish a European type of society
from the type of society in the United States (see Albert, 1992). References to
the United States that have a competitive edge may now be found rather
frequently in official EU documents (e.g. European Commission, 2004, 2005a).
A first, still more implicit example was contained in the conclusions of the
2000 Lisbon European Council setting the strategic goal for the Union ‘to
become the most dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable
of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social
cohesion’ (European Council, 2000a).
Here, as in other documents, the idea seems to be that the European
Union should be conceived of as a ‘USA plus’, i.e. as a type of society that
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delivers everything the United States has to offer, but also some additional
elements that make a society worth living in. In terms of the economy, this
means that Europe combines the growth dynamic of a market economy with
the coordinating social dialogue of the collective bargaining partners. In terms
of the state, it means that European countries are not only free democracies
but also redistributive welfare states that supplement the market with a distri-
bution of life chances that smoothes social inequalities. In terms of society in
the narrower sense, it finally means that, in addition to providing oppor-
tunities for the individual pursuit of happiness, European societies promote
solidarity bonds between individuals that strengthen social cohesion.
Anthony Giddens (2005) captured the essence of this European claim to
superiority in a nutshell by stating that the European social model combines
economic dynamism with social justice.
The purpose of this contribution is to find out to what extent such
assumptions actually hold true empirically. An empirical clarification of the
commonalities and differences between Europe and the United States is
conceptually and politically important for two reasons. First, in European
policy debates, the United States in practice always provides the implicit or
explicit reference category: whereas liberals usually stress American strengths
that are supposedly lacking in Europe – i.e. freedom, openness, flexibility,
dynamism – those on the political left usually claim unique European
strengths such as a high degree of social integration combined with a low
degree of repressive controls. Second, reservations against using the concept
of a European social model are being voiced, because some political observers
see the very concept as an element of social closure that seeks to delimit
Europe from the rest of the world, thus undermining a much more funda-
mental unity between Europe and the United States. Whereas Samuel Hunt-
ington (1993) expects future cleavages along the lines of ‘the west against the
rest’, Europeans such as Timothy Garton Ash (2005) or Ralf Dahrendorf (2006)
warn against emphasizing European particularities by referring to the joint
tradition of freedom and enlightenment in Europe and America. For them, it
is even no longer the concept of ‘the west’ but the more embracing concept
of the ‘free world’ that provides the most appropriate point of departure for
defining collective identities in a globalized world. This was echoed by British
politicians such as Tony Blair (2005) or Gordon Brown (2005) who have
warned against an ‘inward-looking Europe’, which would primarily seek to
deepen its internal integration, and advocated an open ‘global Europe’ instead
which does not seek to protect Europeans from global markets but rather aims
at enhancing their ability to compete and to cope with globalization.
By looking at three types of data in a longitudinal perspective, the follow-
ing sections will clarify which features Europe and the United States have in
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common and to what extent they differ. First I will take a look at demographic
and economic growth dynamics, then I will examine the changing role of the
state, and finally I will inspect the degree of social inequality in society. All
comparisons will focus on a common set of key questions: How big are differ-
ences between Europe and the United States in comparison with differences
within Europe? Is there convergence in the most recent period of globaliz-
ation? Are there several social models rather than just one in Europe, and to
what extent has the recent enlargement contributed to making Europe and
the United States more or less similar?
In order to reduce the complexities of the empirical world, the following
descriptions will not be presented for individual countries. Instead, Europe
will be subdivided into various families of nations by distinguishing between
the new member states (NMS) on one side and five groups of older member
states on the other. The grouping of older member states departs from the
distinction of different worlds of welfare in the comparative welfare state
literature (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1996; Ferrera, 1996). Denmark, Finland and
Sweden are combined into a group of Nordic or Scandinavian countries that
have encompassing social security institutions with universal coverage and
generous social benefits, financed to a large degree from general taxation.
Ireland and the United Kingdom are grouped together as Anglo-Saxon
countries representing a liberal approach to welfare policies in which social
programmes are primarily targeted on needy persons, leaving more affluent
groups free to opt out for private provision. Austria, Belgium, France and
Germany form a category of Continental European countries that are in
between these two polar types, because social policies are as generous and
inclusive as those in Scandinavia but rely more on income replacement than
on services and are more focused on dependent workers, with a heavy
reliance on social insurance contributions levied on earnings from work.
Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain are grouped together to form a distinct
family of South European nations with more residual and also more frag-
mented social provisions.
The Netherlands and Luxembourg were not assigned to any particular
group but combined into a separate category. With respect to the Netherlands,
there is no consensus in the comparative literature on welfare states about
what type of policy regime the country represents. Whereas some authors see
it as representative of a social democratic or Scandinavian type of welfare state
(e.g. Goodin et al., 1999; Sapir, 2005), others rank it as a Christian democratic
or Continental welfare state model (Van Kersbergen, 1995; Hay, 2006). Luxem-
bourg was not assigned to the family of Continental welfare states because its
role as a centre of European policy-making and of international financial trans-
actions has given the country a peculiar growth dynamic, which should not
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be counted as a collective property of any particular family of nations, and
which, in combination with its small size, would have a disproportionate effect
on any group average. Hence, the following comparisons refer to (unweighted)
average developments in six families of European nations and to the United
States. Distinguishing between several types of European nations will also
allow me to inspect whether the differences between them, which the
comparative welfare state typologies highlight, are more prominent than their
similarities, which Hall and Soskice (2001) stress when differentiating merely
between ‘liberal’ and ‘coordinated market economies’.
Empirical data: Unity and diversity in Europe following
enlargement and the comparison with the United States
Growth dynamics and macroeconomic performance
Population development is perhaps the most basic element of the change
dynamics in a given society. If the population is growing, there is also growth
potential for markets; where it is shrinking, investors, all other conditions
being equal, are inclined to turn away. In this sense we may expect a linkage
between economic growth and population growth, especially with regard to
the population of working age.
Demography is a key area where Europe is losing ground compared with
the United States. The USA was able to reverse the trend towards shrinking
fertility rates in the mid 1970s. Presently its fertility rate stands close to 2.1,
which is frequently taken as the standard for successful replacement of the
population under current conditions.1 In the EU, fertility rates declined
steeply until the mid 1990s. Although they subsequently started growing
again, they are still far below the replacement level.2 The diversity within
Europe is just as noteworthy as the difference from the United States,
however. In the new member states (NMS), the post-socialist transformation
was coupled with a steep and continuous decline in birth rates. Today the
NMS join the South European countries in having fertility rates far below the
European mean.3 On the other hand, the Anglo-Saxon nations and the Scan-
dinavian countries come closest to the American standard, achieving fertility
levels way above the European mean. The Continental European countries
are close to the mean, but within this group there are big differences between
France and Germany. Luxembourg and the Netherlands have similar levels
of fertility to the Nordic countries. These differences within Europe have been
fairly persistent, with no clear signs of convergence, and the Eastern enlarge-
ment further contributed to this diversity.
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The huge differences in fertility translate into widely differing forecasts
of future population developments. According to the United Nations’ World
Population Prospects (United Nations, 2005, medium variant), the American
population will grow by roughly one-third until 2050, from almost 300 million
to almost 400 million. In contrast, the population of the EU-25 will shrink by
2%. Given the vast differences in national developments, this crude average
conceals widely divergent patterns. A more or less sizeable shrinkage of the
population is projected for six old member states – Austria, Belgium,
Germany, Greece, Italy and Spain – as well as for the eight post-socialist new
member states. In contrast, at least moderate population growth is expected
for the other 11 countries. The American pattern of dynamic population
growth is followed not only by the two Anglo-Saxon countries but to some
extent also by Scandinavia and by Luxembourg and the Netherlands. This is
a first indication that there are not only different social models with widely
divergent growth dynamics in Europe, but also different kinds of models with
similar growth prospects despite their considerable differences in institutions
and policy traditions.
A similar pattern appears if we look at recent developments in the
economy. The United States clearly outpaces Europe with respect to the
achieved standard of living. Measured by purchasing power parities, the GDP
per capita of the United States is about 50% higher than the EU-25 average.
Within the EU, Luxembourg is the only country to surpass the American level
of living. If we ignore short-term fluctuations in the business cycle, the USA
has basically preserved its comparative advantage over European countries
during the past decade. The new member states undergoing the post-
socialist transition had to weather a much deeper and longer-lasting economic
slump than West European countries experienced during the Great
Depression of the 1930s. After the turn of the millennium, however, they were
able to catch up somewhat, with growth rates far above the EU mean. The
Anglo-Saxon countries, as well as Luxembourg and the Netherlands, have
particularly favourable growth records. Growth in the Scandinavian nations
was slightly higher than in the old EU as a whole, allowing the Nordic nations
to preserve a more or less constant distance from the EU-25 mean as well as
from the United States. In contrast, sluggish growth prevailed in the four
Continental European countries, which continued to fall behind. The group
of South European countries slightly improved its relative position in the most
recent period. On the whole, European countries have not converged under
the competitive pressures of globalization, but rather have diverged. The
positive developments in Luxembourg and the Netherlands as well as in 
the Anglo-Saxon countries stand in sharp contrast to the relative decline in
the Continental Europe countries, which were ahead of the Scandinavian
nations up to the mid 1990s but subsequently fell behind.
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Recent employment records confirm that there are widely diverging
patterns of development in Europe (see Figure 1). Most European countries
still lag far behind the strategic goal of the Lisbon European Council to raise
the employment rate to 70% by 2010. In contrast, the United States surpassed
this target a long time ago and has continued to remain above it even during
the most recent economic downturn.
In the old EU-15, the aggregate employment rate increased by almost five
percentage points between 1994 and 2003. Even though the employment gap
separating the EU-15 from the USA was more than halved, the American
employment level is still more than five percentage points higher. Employ-
ment levels in the Continental European countries remained close to the EU-
15 mean throughout the observed period, whereas the South European
countries caught up to some extent. After a steep decline in employment
during the post-socialist transition, the new member states experienced basi-
cally jobless growth in the most recent period, as their employment level stag-
nated below 60% on average. In the remaining three groups of countries,
employment records are more favourable. The Anglo-Saxon countries and
Luxembourg and the Netherlands pulled far ahead of the EU-15 mean. The
highest level of employment, however, continues to be achieved in the Nordic
countries, which had temporarily shrinking job numbers during the early
1990s, but recovered to surpass the Lisbon target and even the American
employment level in the most recent years.
Within Europe, there was a trend towards slight convergence on growing
levels of employment. The Eastern enlargement did not interrupt this trend
because employment levels in the NMS are roughly similar to those in South
European countries. With employment levels ranging from 51% in Poland to
75% in Denmark, the magnitude of cross-country variations within Europe
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Figure 1 Development of the employment rate in Europe and the USA, 1990–2003
(% of population aged 15–64).
Sources: EU-25 – European Commission (1998, 2004); NMS, 1998–2003 – European Commission
(2004); 1990–2003 (% 15–59): UNICEF (2004); USA – OECD (2004a).
continues to be striking. The range of variation within Europe is much bigger
than the rather moderate difference of eight percentage points between the
United States and the European mean. The remarkable fact beyond the high
degree of European heterogeneity is that there are distinct models of relative
success. In addition to the Anglo-Saxon countries – to which liberal econo-
mists usually draw attention – not only Luxembourg and the Netherlands but
also the Scandinavian countries managed to create jobs at a rate far above the
average. The fact that these countries achieved similar trajectories of employ-
ment on the basis of widely differing welfare state arrangements suggests that,
even under the pressures of globalization, a fairly wide array of policy choices
remains viable. Since a high level of social protection is also among the goals
that the European Union seeks to promote, the next section takes a closer look
at the development of state activities and recent social policy trajectories.
The scope of state activity
An analysis of the changing role of the state in Europe first requires mention
of the positive impact that the EU enlargements to Southern and Eastern
Europe had on the proliferation and consolidation of democracy. Democratic
regime change is one of the most successful exports of the European Union.
A second noteworthy trend is the shrinkage of state activities (see Figure 2).
After reaching an all-time high in the early 1990s, the level of public expen-
diture was reduced in all EU member states. The aggregate public expendi-
ture ratio of the EU-15 shrank by six percentage points between 1995 and
2004. Since the state sector is distinctly smaller in the NMS, these recent
national developments and the EU enlargement combined to bring European
spending levels closer to that of the United States.
Starting from particularly high levels, the Nordic countries stood out with
the most drastic cutbacks in the 1990s, but this trend was halted after the turn
of the century. With spending levels above 50% of GDP, the Nordic countries
still have by far the highest level of government expenditure in the EU. At
the other end of the European spectrum, Ireland and the United Kingdom
come closest to the United States with spending levels of 39% and 44%,
respectively. In both Anglo-Saxon nations, however, the long-term decline
gave way to renewed growth after the turn of the century. The other European
countries are in between those polar types, with the group of Continental
countries closer to the Scandinavian levels and the other three groups all
below the EU-15 aggregate level. The wide divergence in public spending
levels of the Scandinavian and the Anglo-Saxon countries is remarkable,
because it did not impede these countries from achieving similar success in
terms of macroeconomic performance.
European Union Politics 7(3)4 0 0
The fairly steep decline in public expenditure ratios after the mid 1990s
should not be interpreted as a race to the bottom. First, the downward trend
in public spending has been reversed in more recent years. Secondly, on the
revenue side there is constancy rather than shrinkage. In 2004, taxes and social
contributions in the EU-15 claimed the same share of GDP on aggregate as
in 1995 (39.9%). The new member states saw a minor shrinkage of the revenue
share between 1995 and 2000, but this was brought to a halt and even slightly
reversed after the turn of the century. Europe thus did not follow the
American pattern of shrinking state revenues. Because the downturn in public
spending was accompanied by a rather stable share of revenues, public
deficits were reduced. Judging by statistical measures of dispersion such as
the range or the standard deviation, there was no convergence to lower or
higher levels of state revenues in Europe, but rather a constant degree of vari-
ation. With a range from 28% in Lithuania to 51% in Sweden, differences
within Europe are once again bigger than the difference between the United
States and the European mean, which is roughly 14 percentage points.
Measured by the social expenditure ratio, the development of the
European welfare state reached its peak in the middle of the 1990s (see
Figure 3). After an initial shrinkage of roughly one percentage point, the
aggregate spending ratio of the EU-15 has remained fairly stagnant more
recently. In this sense there are no signs of a general race to the bottom. With
a reduction of five percentage points, welfare state shrinkage was most
pronounced in the Nordic countries, which moved closer to the European
mean and now have spending levels similar to those of the Continental
European countries.4 The Anglo-Saxon countries and Luxembourg and the
Netherlands also reduced their spending levels by several points during 
the 1990s but reversed the downward trend after the turn of the century. The
South European countries stand out for an upward trend in social spending,
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Figure 2 Development of general government expenditure, 1990–2004 (% of GDP).
Sources: Eurostat (2005); USA – OECD (2004b).
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which was particularly marked in Greece and Portugal. Since joining the EU,
the social policies of these countries have been marked by attempts to ‘catch
up’ rather than by a strategy of social dumping (Guillén and Matsaganis, 2000;
Guillén and Palier, 2004). Because the new member states have distinctly
lower levels of social spending, the Eastern enlargement contributed to
making the EU somewhat more similar to the United States in this respect.
From a policy perspective, two aspects are particularly noteworthy. First,
the similarity of spending levels in the Nordic and Continental European
countries is remarkable, because it shows that states with similar levels of
social spending can have widely diverging records of macroeconomic
performance. What matters is less the aggregate level of spending and more
the concrete mix in terms of transfers and services, of active and passive
measures, and of outlays for social investment and social consumption.
Secondly, the reversal of social spending patterns in the Anglo-Saxon
countries contradicts the image of purely liberal policies aimed at unleashing
market forces in these countries.
Within the old EU-15 there are no clear-cut signs of convergence, as both
the range and the standard deviation of spending levels were roughly the
same in 2002 as 12 years earlier. Differences within the enlarged Europe are
once again more marked than the difference between the European mean and
the United States. Estonia and Lithuania have now joined Ireland as countries
with similarly low or even lower levels of social spending than the USA,
which is thus not completely outside the margin of variation we find within
Europe.
The differences between European countries and the United States
become even smaller when we move from the usual data on gross social
spending to figures on net spending (Adema, 2001) and take tax credits,
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Figure 3 Development of social expenditure, 1990–2002 (% of GDP).
Sources: Eurostat (2005); USA – OECD (2004b).
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mandatory private benefits and taxes on benefits into account (Adema and
Ladaique, 2005). In terms of gross social spending, Denmark and Sweden
have expenditure ratios almost twice that of the USA, and Ireland is the only
European country to undercut the American level of social spending. In terms
of net expenditure, however, the USA is clearly surpassed by only three EU
member states, is almost on a par with Denmark and five other countries,
and is clearly ahead of another five European nations.
The resulting policy implications can hardly be overstated. Obviously,
limitation of welfare state responsibilities cannot be equated with liberation
from social costs. Social risks that are not or no longer provided for by the
state fall either on firms, which have to provide occupational welfare, or on
private households, which have to bear the costs from their private purse thus
curbing their disposable income. Consequently, social costs accrue anyhow,
but they are merely borne at another level, which usually means that they are
less equally distributed than in the case of public schemes with universal
coverage. The next section will take a closer look at distributional outcomes
by inspecting data on social inequalities.
The degree of social inequality
Whatever the concise meaning of the European social model may be, its
downside is evident in the persistence of mass unemployment and the
concomitant inequality between job holders and jobless persons. In 2003, the
aggregate European unemployment rate of 9.1% contrasted with an American
rate of 6.0% (European Commission, 2004). Only seven EU member states had
an unemployment rate below the American level (Ireland, the United
Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Austria).
Particularly high jobless rates prevailed in the new member states, in the
South European countries and in the Continental European countries (with
the exception of Austria). Ireland and the United Kingdom stand out with a
particularly successful reduction in unemployment during the 1990s. Almost
similar success was also recorded in the Nordic countries, however. Starting
from above-average unemployment rates in the early 1990s, the Nordic
countries approached the low American level after the turn of the century.
Thus they curbed unemployment almost as successfully as the Anglo-Saxon
countries despite their much larger public sectors and their more generous
welfare state schemes.
Crude unemployment rates in fact understate the comparative advantage
of the United States over Europe because they conceal huge differences in the
structure of unemployment. Only 12% of the unemployed in America have
been out of work for more than one year, compared with 36% of their
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counterparts in Europe. In the new member states, roughly half of jobless
people have been without work for this long, but there are huge nation-
specific differences, with the share of long-term unemployment ranging from
25% in Cyprus to 65% in Slovakia (European Commission, 2004).
There are some indications that the European employment strategy is
beginning to bear fruit because the rate of long-term unemployment has
recently been shrinking almost everywhere (see Figure 4). High levels of long-
term unemployment still persist in the NMS and in Southern Europe. The
long-term unemployment rate in the Continental European countries corre-
sponds almost exactly to the EU-15 mean. The two Anglo-Saxon countries
were successful in almost eradicating their originally high levels of long-term
unemployment. Together with Luxembourg and the Netherlands, they now
come closest to the American level. Once again, the Nordic countries are in
close proximity to the Anglo-Saxon nations. Given concerns about the disin-
centive effects of generous social benefits, this is remarkable because Denmark
and Sweden have unemployment and social assistance benefits that are even
higher than those of Continental European nations such as Germany (for a
comparison of benefit levels, see European Commission, 2005b).
Whereas the high and persistent level of unemployment must be
considered as the downside of the European social model, a relatively low
degree of social inequality and poverty rank among its merits. Compared
with the United States, European countries have a much more equal income
distribution. The decile ratio – which shows how much more income those
in the 90th percentile have compared with those in the 10th – is a telling
summary measure of the degree of inequality separating the rich from the
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Figure 4 Development of the long-term unemployment rate, 1992–2003 (% of labour
force).
Sources: European Commission (2004); USA – OECD (2004a).
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poor. In 2000, this ratio was 5.5 in the United States, compared with an EU
average of 3.6 (Luxembourg Income Study, 2005). Only 5 of the 20 European
countries for which data are available have a ratio in excess of 4.0, and Estonia
is the only case to come close to the American level of inequality. The other
new member states have moderate degrees of inequality comparable to the
situation in Western Europe. In the old EU-15, the highest degree of inequal-
ity prevails in Ireland and the United Kingdom, followed by Spain and Italy.
In contrast, the gap between the rich and the poor is smallest in the three
Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands. While approaching the Anglo-
Saxon countries in terms of macroeconomic performance, the Scandinavian
countries thus combine their relative success with much lower levels of
income inequality.
Once again, differences within Europe are even more pronounced than
the difference between the United States and the European average. Over
time, however, the European countries have converged somewhat as inequali-
ties increased, particularly in the more egalitarian Scandinavian countries.
Table 1 compares the degree of inequality in the early 1980s and around
2000 by showing Gini coefficients as a summary measure of income disper-
sion, as well as two ratios that measure the gap between top and middle
incomes and between middle and low incomes. These ratios help to determine
if inequality increased primarily because those at the top pulled further ahead
or because those at the bottom fell behind. Among the 12 European countries
for which change data are available, we find increasing inequality in all but 4
nations. In 5 countries, inequalities increased to an even higher degree than in
the United States. The top incomes pulled ahead of the middle position in 9
European countries as well as in the United States. In addition, those at the
bottom of the income distribution fell increasingly behind in all European
countries except Sweden, while not losing further ground in the United States.
Over the past two decades, Europe has thus moved into the direction of the
United States in terms of income inequality, even though the degree of inequal-
ity is still much higher and grew even more in America.5
The rate of relative income poverty, which indicates the percentage of the
population coping with less than half of the national median income, also
distinguishes Europe from the United States (see Table 2). The American
income poverty rate of 17% is matched nowhere in Europe.
According to Eurostat data, the variation within the enlarged EU ranges
from 4% in Denmark to 16% in Slovakia. Double-digit levels of relative
income poverty prevail in Ireland and the United Kingdom, in Southern
Europe and in four of the new member states. Once again, we find that the
relative success of the Anglo-Saxon countries in terms of growth dynamics is
coupled with an over-proportionate preponderance of social problems,
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Table 1 The development of income inequality in Europe and the United States
Gini coefficient 90/50 ratio 50/10 ratio
Country 1980s c. 2000 Change +/– 1980s c. 2000 Change +/– 1980s c. 2000 Change +/–
Denmark 0.254 1.60 2.01
Finland 0.209 0.247 18 1.51 1.64 + 1.72 1.77 +
Sweden 0.218 0.252 16 1.51 1.68 + 1.79 1.76 –
Scandinavian 0.227 0.250 17 1.54 1.66 + 1.84 1.77 –
Austria 0.227 0.260 15 1.62 1.73 + 1.78 1.83 +
Belgium 0.227 0.277 22 1.62 1.74 + 1.69 1.90 +
France 0.292 0.288a –1 1.93 1.91a – 1.79 1.85a +
Germany 0.268 0.264 –1 1.73 1.77 + 1.85 1.86 +
Continental 0.254 0.272 18 1.73 1.79 + 1.78 1.86 +
Greece 0.338 2.07 2.30
Italy 0.306 0.333 9 1.97 1.99 + 2.06 2.25 +
Spain 0.318 0.340 7 2.02 2.09 + 2.16 2.29 +
Southern 0.337 13 2.05 + 2.28 +
Luxembourg 0.237 0.260 10 1.72 1.84 + 1.72 1.76 +
Netherlands 0.260 0.248b –5 1.86 1.67b – 1.58 1.78b +
LU/NL 0.249 0.254 5 1.79 1.76 – 1.65 1.77 +
Ireland 0.328 0.323 –2 2.09 1.89 – 2.02 2.41 +
UK 0.303 0.345b 14 1.94 2.15b + 1.95 2.13b +
IE/UK 0.316 0.334 18 2.02 2.02 0 1.99 2.27 +
USA 0.335 0.368 10 2.04 2.10 + 2.80 2.60 –
Czech Rep. 0.259c 1.79c 1.68c
Estonia 0.361 2.34 2.17
Hungary 0.295b 1.94 1.84b
Poland 0.271 0.293b 8 1.77 1.88b + 1.98 1.91b –
Slovak Rep. 0.241c 1.62c 1.78c
Slovenia 0.249b 1.67b 1.89b
NMS 0.283 1.87 1.88
Source: Luxembourg Income Study (2005).
Notes: a 1994; b 1999; c 1996.
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Table 2 Relative income poverty in Europe and the United States (percentage below 50% of equivalent median income)
Total (LIS) Children (LIS) Elderly (LIS)
Total Eurostat
Country ca. 2001 1980s 2000 Change +/– 1980s 2000 Change +/– 1980s 2000 Change +/–
Denmark 4 10.1 4.7 31.5
Finland 6 5.4 5.4 0 2.8 2.8 0 11.9 8.5 –
Sweden 5 7.5 6.5 – 3.5 4.2 + 7.2 7.7 +
Scandinavian 5 7.7 6.0 – 3.7 3.5 – 16.9 8.1 –
Austria 6 6.7 7.7 + 4.8 7.8 + 18.5 13.7 –
Belgium 6 4.5 8.0 + 4.0 6.7 + 10.9 16.4 +
France 9 7.4 8.0a + 7.5 7.9a + 4.8 9.8a +
Germany 6 7.9 8.3 + 8.5 9.0 + 14.0 10.1 –
Continental 7 6.6 8.0 + 6.2 7.9 + 12.1 12.5 +
Greece 14 14.4 12.9 27.0
Italy 13 10.4 12.7 + 11.4 16.6 + 13.1 13.7 +
Spain 13 12.2 14.3 + 12.7 16.1 + 18.8 23.4 +
Portugal 13
Southern 13 13.8 + 15.2 + 21.4 +
Luxembourg 6 5.3 6.0 + 5.2 9.1 + 12.7 3.7 –
Netherlands 6 3.9 7.3b + 2.7 9.8b + 3.7 2.4b –
LU/NL 6 4.6 6.7 + 4.0 9.5 + 8.2 3.1 –
Ireland 15 11.1 16.5 + 13.8 17.2 + 14.4 35.8 +
UK 11 9.1 12.4b + 12.5 15.3b + 7.0 20.5b +
IE/UK 13 10.1 14.5 + 13.2 16.3 + 10.7 28.2 +
USA 17 17.8 17.0 – 25.1 21.9 – 23.5 24.7 +
Czech Rep. 4 4.9c 6.6c 7.4c
Hungary 6 6.7b 8.8b 3.7b
Poland 10 9.7 8.6b – 11.7 12.7b + 17.0 3.6b –
Slovak Rep. 16 7.0c n.a. n.a.
Estonia 11 12.4 13.6 11.0
Latvia 9
Lithuania 10
Slovenia 6 8.2b 6.9b 17.9b
NMS 9 8.0 9.5 11.4
Source: Luxembourg Income Study (2005).
Notes: n.a. = owing to the nature of the survey, figures are not available. a 1994; b 1999; c 1996.
whereas the Scandinavian countries and Luxembourg and the Netherlands
combine a similar degree of success with much lower levels of poverty and
inequality.6
Finland and Sweden not only have comparatively low levels of poverty
but also resisted the recent European trend of growing income poverty. In 10
of the other 11 countries for which change data are available (with Poland as
the only exception), relative income poverty increased over the past two
decades. This is in stark contrast to the United States, where relative poverty
actually diminished somewhat between 1986 and 2000. Whereas the poverty
rate among elderly people decreased in 5 of the 12 European countries, the
poverty rate of households with children increased in all countries except
Finland. In the United States in contrast, the poverty rate for households with
children decreased, while poverty among the elderly increased.
Income inequality is not the only relevant type of social inequality. Since
life chances in knowledge societies depend increasingly on learning,
educational poverty and inequalities in cognitive and educational skills must
become a growing concern. If we consider those who have less than upper
secondary education to be at risk of educational marginalization, European
countries do not compare very favourably with the United States (see
Figure 5).
Although educational poverty has diminished, so that there is less of a
gap between the United States and European countries among younger
cohorts (aged 25–34), only the Nordic countries have succeeded in keeping
the percentage of younger people without upper secondary qualifications as
low as the United States. At the opposite pole we find the South European
nations, with the extreme case of Portugal where almost two-thirds of the
younger generation do not achieve this level. The Anglo-Saxon countries,
together with Luxembourg and the Netherlands, also fall short of universal
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Figure 5 Educational poverty, 2003 (percentage of population aged 25–34 and 55–64
who have not attained at least upper secondary education).
Source: Calculated from OECD (2005: 36).
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higher education – more than one in four of their younger people leave school
without upper secondary qualifications. Once again, there is a high degree of
nation-specific variation in Europe, which is particularly strong in the new
member states, where only 6% of the young in Slovakia but 43% of their peers
in Poland leave the educational systems without higher qualifications. The
margin of variation within Europe is thus once more bigger than the gap
separating the United States and the European average.
A high output of qualifications does not necessarily indicate satisfactory
outcomes in terms of acquired skills. Thus, according to the International
Adult Literacy Study, the high percentage of young people with upper
secondary education in the United States combines with a high percentage of
people with only modest reading skills (OECD and Statistics Canada, 2000).
In Europe, the percentage of educationally handicapped people with only
elementary reading skills is lower and, at the same time, the gap separating
those at the top and the bottom of the skill distribution is smaller. Once again,
there are noteworthy differences within the EU, however. In Scandinavian
and Continental European countries, less than 15% of adults fail to get beyond
the most basic level in document literacy, and those in the 5th percentile of
the skill distribution are at least half as good as those in the 95th percentile.
In the Anglo-Saxon countries and in the United States, about 25% do not get
beyond the most elementary level, and those at the top are more than twice
as proficient as those at the bottom. Among EU countries, only Portugal and
some of the new member states have even higher proportions of education-
ally marginalized people and higher degrees of inequality than the USA. This
implies that, in this area too, differences within Europe are larger than differ-
ences between the European average and the American level.7
A final question concerns the extent to which the more equal European
societies are also more cohesive and thus less dependent upon coercive
controls than the USA. Judged by the comparatively large proportion of the
population in prison, the high degree of poverty and inequality in the United
States has its price (see Western and Beckett, 1999).8 The bigger the low-wage
sector, the lower the wages in this sector and the higher the degree of inequal-
ity in the society, the more incentives there are to substitute crime for work.
In 2002, the American incarceration rate of 700 per 100,000 population
compared with an average of 136 for the 24 European countries for which
data are available (United Nations, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c). In the European
Union, the three Baltic nations are the only ones with a rate of over 300.
Average incarceration rates are higher in the new member states than in the
old ones but, in all groups of countries that I have distinguished here, there
is a very high degree of nation-specific variation. In the old EU-15, the three
Scandinavian countries and Greece (with data for 1995) stand out for their
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Figure 6 The location of the USA within the social space of the European Union (2000/2003).
Note: All variables were standardized from 0 to 100 in such a way that the value for the maximum country comes close to 90.
relatively small prison populations (less than 10% of the American level).
Portugal and the United Kingdom, which have the most densely populated
prisons, reach about one-fifth of the American level. The variation within
Europe, ranging from 56 in Slovenia to 363 in Estonia, is in this case much
less marked than the difference between the EU average and the American
figure. Together with a high degree of income inequality and relative poverty,
the strong reliance on incarceration as a method of social control is thus one
of the few key features that clearly distinguish the United States from
European nations.
Conclusion: What remains of the idea of a European
social model
The empirical analysis shows that the notion of a European social model is
not only imprecise but also misleading in three ways.
First, it implies a fundamental difference between the United States and
Europe, which cannot be sustained in the light of the data. In most respects
we find the United States located well within the social space spanning the
societies of Europe (see Figure 6). The range of variation separating the
countries at the extremes in Europe is frequently bigger than the distance
between the European mean and the United States. If state-level variations
within the United States were taken into account, many differences would
blur even more. Yet there are five elements on which the USA stands at least
somewhat apart from all member states of the European Union: the incarcer-
ation rate is way beyond the upper bound in Europe; the degree of income
inequality as measured by the decile ratio, the Gini coefficient or the relative
poverty rate is higher than anywhere in Europe; the share of public revenues
is lower than anywhere in Europe; long-term unemployment is less frequent
than it is in Europe; and the fertility rate exceeds any level found within the
European Union. Yet, even in these cases, the distance separating the USA
from the most similar country within the EU is not very great, and Europe
has recently moved in the American direction with respect to inequality. The
incarceration rate is the only case where the United States and Europe stand
clearly apart. It is a matter of debate whether this one noteworthy difference
justifies talk of two worlds apart. However, it may be concluded that, in their
pursuit of social integration, European societies achieve somewhat higher
levels of equality and rely much less heavily on coercive control than does
the United States.
The second conclusion is that the notion of a European social model
cannot be based on a set of key features that all member states of the European
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Union would have in common. The variety within Europe is so vast that the
difference between the European mean and the United States usually pales
beside the magnitude of the differences found within the EU. Impressive
differences also prevail between countries that are assigned to a common type
or family of nations. Clearly, the distinction between liberal and coordinated
market economies in Western Europe does not capture the remarkable differ-
ences between Scandinavian, Continental and South European nations to
which the comparative welfare state literature has drawn attention and which
the data presented here confirm. However, even countries with similar sets
of welfare institutions – Austria and Germany, for example – are frequently
found to display widely divergent patterns of development. Hence, when we
look at single countries, the variety within Europe becomes even more
striking, as remarkable national particularities within known families of
nations come to the fore.
Over time, there is no consistent evidence of convergence. Judged by
ranges and standard deviations, European countries have become more
similar in terms of growing levels of employment, but the differences with
respect to public expenditure, public revenues and net social expenditure
have persisted. In this sense, there is no sign of globalization pressures trans-
lating into increasingly uniform policy outcomes. Instead of a unique
European social model, we find a pluralism of nation-states with an impres-
sive degree of particular national features and developmental trajectories. The
Eastern enlargement has increased the degree of heterogeneity within the EU
even further. In some respects it has contributed to making Europe more
similar to the United States – for example, with respect to the more limited
scope of public revenues and higher rates of incarceration. In some other
respects, however, it has also contributed to enhancing differences between
Europe and the USA – for example, in terms of the differences in fertility and
GDP per capita and in unemployment and long-term unemployment.
The third and most relevant insight for policy purposes is that we find
two rather successful social models in Europe rather than just one. In terms
of population dynamics, macroeconomic performance and standard of living,
it is not only the liberal Anglo-Saxon countries but also the Scandinavian
countries that stand out as successful models. The economic success of the
Anglo-Saxon countries is coupled with a reduced welfare state and relatively
high social inequalities, whereas the similar success story in Scandinavia is
combined with more redistributive social policies and with less visible
inequality – in terms not only of income but also of educational skills.
There are two different yet not necessarily mutually exclusive expla-
nations for these two macroeconomic success stories – especially in the field
of labour market developments. One draws attention to the similarities and
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the other highlights the differences in national policies. A similarity of Anglo-
Saxon and Scandinavian countries is that they both pursue social policies
geared towards activating people and with an emphasis on individual
responsibility. In many respects the ‘Third Way’ propagated in Britain by
Anthony Giddens (1998, 2001) and Tony Blair (2006) was merely a rediscov-
ery of the rather old Scandinavian idea originating in union-controlled social
funds that social policy should be enabling and that generous social benefits
should be coupled with flexible labour legislation and with active labour
market policies combining quite strict controls against benefit abuse with a
supply of public works and of vocational training for the unemployed (see
Esping-Andersen, 2002).
A second explanation draws attention to the differences in policies, which
may produce similar success in terms of employment trajectories. Thus Fritz
Scharpf (1986, 2000) has pointed out that there are two distinct pathways to
full employment in the service economy. The first one, which is characteristic
of liberal countries with high income inequalities and a big low-wage sector,
promotes private sector employment in personal services because even
middle-class households can afford to purchase an ample supply of cheap
services. The second one, which is characteristic of Scandinavian countries
with high levels of taxation, relies on expanding public services and creating
jobs in the public sector. Continental European countries, situated mid-way
between these polar types, cannot pursue either strategy, because strong
unions keep income inequalities low, while the high tax and contribution rate
is used for financing welfare state programmes that primarily centre on cash
benefits to replace lost earnings. Hence these countries are less successful in
compensating for the job losses resulting from de-industrialization with an
expansion of service sector jobs.
In a similar vein, labour market economists such as Calmfors and Driffill
(1988) have drawn attention to the fact that countries with centralized collec-
tive bargaining and those with decentralized wage-setting at the firm level
both achieve similarly positive records of macroeconomic performance. Their
explanation is that, at a low level of centralization, individual firms have
sufficient flexibility to adapt to market forces whereas, at a high level of
centralization, encompassing organizations take macroeconomic consider-
ations into account and help to internalize the external effects of wage
increases. At the intermediate level, in contrast, special interest groups are
powerful enough to distort market forces but are not sufficiently encompass-
ing to internalize the social costs of their actions, which means that the
negative effects of cartelization outweigh the positive effects of coordination.
These explanations share the idea that there is a U-shaped relationship
between social models and macroeconomic performance, so that countries of
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the middle way are most likely to face difficulties. To the extent that this is
true, it has important implications for the open method of coordination prac-
tised within the EU and for the chances of learning from best practice. If there
really are different pathways to success, the adoption of an isolated policy
instrument may not fit into the institutional setting or the specific policy mix
of a given country, and a mutual approximation of polar types to the middle
might produce undesired effects.
Given the difficulties in giving the notion of a European social model
precise empirical meaning, it has recently been proposed that the concept
should be seen as a deliberately ambiguous and elastic political metaphor
that aims at fostering an epistemic European policy community with a shared
view of social problems (Jepsen and Pascual, 2005). The concept is thus
primarily seen as a rhetorical resource helping to shape cognitive maps
among decision-makers and to legitimize the identity-building project of EU
agencies. From this perspective, the European social model would be a project
and a process rather than a concrete entity, based less on common institutions
or joint values than on a way to perceive and define policy challenges.
This idea is probably more realistic than the assumption that the notion
of a European social model could serve as a fundamental idée directrice to
which all national policy-makers would subscribe, leaving only the concrete
means to reach the common objective to their discretion. The more political
objectives are cast in fundamental, symbolically or ideologically charged
ways, the more difficult it presumably becomes to find consensus and to forge
coalitions. Recent speeches by Tony Blair (2005) or Gordon Brown (2005) on
one side, and by Gerhard Schröder (2005) on the other, have made it quite
clear that British ideas of an open ‘global Europe’ and Franco-German ideas
of a ‘social Europe’ resisting the pressures of globalization have little in
common on principle. Hence it is difficult to define a substantive goal or
vision for the enlarged EU (see Ash, 2005). In this situation, fundamental
debates about the idée directrice that Europe should follow are likely to
produce little more than political stalemate or lofty rhetoric.
Greater momentum will probably be achieved if concrete problems are
put on the agenda of incremental reform in a more pragmatic vein. During
the Second World War, Lord Beveridge (1942) described the postwar chal-
lenge as the fight against the five giants of want, disease, squalor, ignorance
and idleness. A substantial part of this fight has been won in European
welfare states, but all European societies are now confronted with four new
challenges, which can be summarized as the four Cs: Children, Care, Careers
and College education. In ageing societies with pay-as-you-go pension
schemes, the sustainability of pensions requires first of all that more children
are born so that the growing mismatch between the size of the pensioner
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generations and the size of the generations of contributors will be mitigated.
However, more children will be born only if extended child care and elderly
care services make it easier to combine work and family life. Coping with the
demographic imbalances in pension schemes will furthermore require a boost
in the number of employed people and an increase in their productivity. In
the knowledge society, career opportunities and productivity increasingly
hinge upon educational skills. Hence, efforts must be made to raise enrol-
ment in higher education and to universalize college education in order to
promote better career opportunities. Given that educational poverty is at non-
negligible levels in several European countries, it is remarkable how little
explicit reference official EU documents make to universal access to higher
education as a key element of the desirable European social model.
It will probably be easier to achieve pragmatic consensus on how to meet
the four major challenges if fundamental debates among proponents of differ-
ent social models are avoided. In the enlarged European Union, it is not the
choice between the welfare state and the liberal market economy that is at
stake. Instead, states with different types of welfare state arrangements are in
search of appropriate solutions for the major challenges. When decision-
makers exchange information on best practice in dealing with these chal-
lenges, they should keep three insights in mind: (1) there are different
pathways to success; (2) similar policies may produce different effects in
different contexts, so proposed policies must fit into the institutional set-up
of a given country; (3) convergence towards a middle way is not always the
most promising key to success, and may even prove to aggravate problems.
If these insights are born in mind, the open method of coordination may
provide useful opportunities for policy learning among European decision-
makers.
Notes
1 However, there are big differences in the fertility rates of different population
groups, and the total fertility rate of non-Hispanic white American women
(1.86) is currently also well below the level of population replacement (Martin
et al., 2005).
2 In all cases where reference is made to data that are not shown here in any
reproducible form, graphs presenting the empirical evidence together with
the sources may be found on the EUP website at http://www.
uni-konstanz.de/eup/issues.htm. The time-span covered by different data
may vary owing to problems of data availability. The general target was to
cover the period 1990–2003.
3 The terms ‘mean’ and ‘aggregate’ are used here to refer to official aggregate
data relating to the EU-15 or the EU-25 as a whole, whereas the term ‘average’
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is used to refer to calculated averages for a given number of countries that
are not weighted by population size, thus counting each nation equally as a
political unit.
4 This clearly contradicts the findings reported by Colin Hay, who states that
‘it is the Nordic welfare states that have grown the most’ and that, under
globalization, ‘the most generous welfare states have thrived’ (Hay, 2006: 7).
However, Hay’s insights are based on time series data that begin in the 1960s
or 1970s and end in the mid 1990s, thus leaving the most recent period of
welfare state adaptation to competitive pressures out of consideration.
5 In addition to changes in policies and wages, there are also structural deter-
minants of the growth in inequality such as the trend towards increasing
homogamy (marriage within rather than across class barriers), which is
related to the expansion of higher education among women (Esping-
Andersen, 2006).
6 When comparing relative income poverty rates in various countries, one must
bear in mind that apparently identical poverty thresholds (defined as a
percentage of the median equivalent income in a given country) combine with
widely divergent levels of income. According to data from Eurostat (2005), a
person living at the 60% relative poverty threshold in Luxembourg has about
seven times the income of a person in the apparently same relative position
in Estonia. Regional disparities in the European Union are thus much bigger
than are differences at the state-level in the United States.
7 There are noteworthy discrepancies between the results of the International
Adult Literacy Study (IALS) on the one hand and the PISA study (OECD,
2004c) on the other. Whereas the United States is similarly situated in both
studies – around average performance levels coupled with a high degree of
inequality – some European countries fare either much worse in the PISA
study than in the IALS (Germany) or much better (Ireland). A comprehen-
sive comparison of inequalities in Europe and the USA would also require
taking the degree of integration of immigrant families into account, because
differences in the jobless rate of non-nationals and nationals appear to be
much bigger in Europe than in the United States (Giddens, 2005).
8 In a cross-sectional analysis there is a fairly strong and robust statistical
association between the degree of inequality as measured by the Gini index
and the relative size of the prison population in various countries (r = .61
for the EU-15 and the United States; r = .67 within Europe).
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